INTRODUCTION
Business failure occurs when "a fall in revenues and/or a rise in expenses are of such a magnitude that the firm becomes insolvent and is unable to attract new debt or equity funding; consequently, it cannot continue to operate under the current ownership and management" (Shepherd, 2003, p. 318) . Such failure reveals what does not work, which in turn informs subsequent entrepreneurial actions (McGrath, 1999) .
Indeed, given the high uncertainty associated with the pursuit of opportunity (Knight, 1992; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) , failure is a frequent occurrence (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Shane, 2009; Wiklund, Baker, & Shepherd, 2010) . Failure is also believed to be a trigger for sensemaking efforts and a rich information source for learning. Indeed, we define learning from failure as "the sense that one is acquiring, and can apply, knowledge and skills" (Spreitzer, Sutcliffe, Dutton, Sonenshein, & Grant, 2005) from their failure experiences. Consistent with a sensemaking perspective, this definition emphasizes individuals' subjective interpretation of learning (Huy, 1999; Kim, 1993; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011; Weick, 1979) . As entrepreneurs take risks, learn from failures, and act on their new knowledge, economies advance (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007; Knott & Posen, 2005; Mason & Harrison, 2006) .
Although recent theorizing acknowledges the potential benefits of failure (for the economic system), it explores the negative emotional reaction (i.e., grief) individual entrepreneurs experience when 3 their businesses fail (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009 ). For example, Shepherd (2003) described how grief-the negative emotional reaction to the loss of a business-can obstruct an entrepreneur's ability to learn from the experience and, thus, proposed a mode of coping with grief to maximize learning (namely, oscillating between loss and restoration orientations). In a recent study on research scientists' negative emotional reactions to the failure of their projects, Shepherd and colleagues (2011) found considerable heterogeneity in these individuals' emotional states (Barsäde, 2002; Lazarus, 1991) over and above the time since project failure. If there are differences in individuals' emotional reactions to business failure, are there also differences in their efforts to make sense of such experiences?
The purpose of this paper is to explore how different emotional states-"transient reaction [s] to specific encounters with the environment, one that comes and goes depending on particular conditions" (Lazarus, 1991: 47) -reflected in entrepreneurs' narratives impact their efforts to make sense of failure experiences. Narratives reflect (and give) meaning to events (Orr, 1995) , and thereby play a critical role in the process of sensemaking (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008) . In this study, we use a multiple case study approach to generate new insights from field-based data. We chose this approach because it is particularly appropriate for exploring phenomena for which data are rare or "sensitive" and extant theories do not appear useful for exploring the research question. Indeed, under such circumstances, a multiple case study approach is more likely to create original and precise accounts of phenomena than approaches using previous existing work or laboratory-based experiments (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The setting is the failure of small businesses. This setting is highly appropriate for the current study because of (1) the "tight" relationship between an entrepreneur and his/her small business (Bird, 1992; Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, Matherne, & Davis, 2005; Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Gartner, 1988 ) (e.g., the identity of the entrepreneur and their business are often tightly intertwined) (Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009; Murnieks & Mosakowski, 2006) , (2) the heterogeneity among entrepreneurs of small businesses (Cardon et 4 al., 2009; Westhead & Wright, 1998) , and (3) the prevalence of both small businesses (Acs & Audretsch, 1990 ) and small business failure (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) in most economies.
A crucial function of this paper is to present the emotional landscape of entrepreneurial failures and entrepreneurs' efforts to make sense of these failure experiences. This perspective contrasts with theories of learning from failure that ignore the role of emotions (e.g., Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Cannon & Edmondson, 2001; Sitkin, 1992) or emphasize negative emotions at the expense of positive emotions (e.g., Shepherd, 2003; . Entrepreneurs, their businesses, and their failures differ in substantial ways, and these differences are likely reflected in the emotional content of entrepreneurs' narratives, which impact their efforts to make sense of business failure. This study offers theoretical, empirically grounded insights from narratives concerning the types of emotional reactions entrepreneurs express in response to business failure and how these reactions impact their ability to make sense of such experiences.
In doing so, we make three primary contributions to the literature. First, the learning from failure literature has highlighted the obstructive role of negative emotions on the sensemaking process (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2002; Shepherd, 2003; Sitkin, 1992) . We found evidence that negative emotions motivated sensemaking efforts. That is, entrepreneurs' narratives that reflected little negative emotional reaction to business failure demonstrated little sensemaking about the loss. Second, whereas the leaning from failure literature has focused on negative emotions (e.g., Shepherd, 2003; , the resilience literature has focused on the role of positive emotions in dealing with adversity (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007) , including how positive emotions "undo" negative emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, 2001) . We found evidence that negative and positive emotions act in concert to facilitate sensemaking-high negative emotions motivate, and high positive emotions inform, sensemaking efforts. Finally, the stress literature (Folkman, 1984) highlights the ineffectiveness and even the detrimental impact of emotion focused coping in relieving stress, especially in the long run (Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; Coyne & Racioppo, 2000) . We found that, at least in terms of making sense of a stressful event-business failure-the entrepreneurs' narratives demonstrated that emotion-focused coping provided the opportunity to generate positive emotions that facilitated their cognitive processing of failure experiences for sensemaking purposes.
Consistent with the multiple case study approach, we begin by detailing our method and then discuss our findings in terms of the emotional and sensemaking content of entrepreneurial narratives.
Contrasting entrepreneurs' narratives across emotional and sensemaking content provides new insights into efforts to make sense of failure experiences. On the whole, this study expands theorizing on "learning from failure" and "entrepreneurial grief" to elucidate the real feelings, thoughts, and behaviours of entrepreneurs attempting to make sense of their business failure experiences. This work also provides insights into the nature of entrepreneurs' narratives and the role of positive emotions in explaining how negative emotions and emotion-focused coping enable cognitions for making sense of business failure.
METHODS

Research Design
Consistent with Yin (2003a Yin ( , 2003b and Eisenhardt (1989) , we used the multiple case study method to build theory from field-based data. As indicated in Table 1 , we sampled 13 failed businesses in the United Kingdom, all of which were privately held and small. The purpose of our sampling was to ensure that these were small businesses-because, as detailed above, there is a tight relationship between an entrepreneur and his/her small business, the prevalence of both small businesses and small business failure in most economies, and the considerable heterogeneity amongst small businesses (e.g., industry [Covin & Slevin, 2006] , and firm size [Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998 ]), amongst entrepreneurs (e.g., age [Levesque & Minniti, 2006] and gender [De Bruin, Brush & Welter, 2007] ), and amongst failures (Shepherd & Cardon, 2009) . To ensure that we captured some of this heterogeneity among entrepreneurs of small businesses we ensured that the sampled entrepreneurs' businesses varied in terms of industry-included 6 retail, engineering, consulting, publishing, information technology (IT), recruitment, agriculture, and confectionary, and size-companies employed from one to 45 employees; the entrepreneurs varied in terms of age-the entrepreneurs ranged in age from 30 years to 62 years, and gender-two entrepreneurs were female and 11 were male; varied in the nature of the failures-two businesses were liquidated involuntarily, eight businesses had liquidated voluntarily, and three businesses had limited assets to liquidate and were instead dissolved by the owners in adherence with guidelines from the registrar of companies, and time since closure-the businesses failed from 1 year to 20 years prior to the research taking place. In all cases, the ultimate demise of the business was undesirable for the entrepreneur. 1 ……………………………... Insert Table 1 about here ……………………………...
Data Collection
We used interviews, observations, and archival records to collect the data. We relied most heavily on semi-structured interviews with the individual entrepreneurs who had experienced business failure. We conducted in-person interviews with the entrepreneurs, often at a coffee shop or a public space (given that some no longer had dedicated office space and also because of the sensitive nature of the interviews we wanted them to choose a location in which they felt most comfortable). The 13 interviews were conducted over a period of six months and were taped and later transcribed. The mean time for the interviews was 60 minutes with one interview lasting as long as two hours. We also kept personal notes made before, during, and after the interview, which included informal observations and discussions not recorded as part of the formal interviews. We created an interview protocol to guide the semi-structured interviews and typically referenced the protocol to start a new line of discussion after the previous point had run its course. The 7 questions were designed to prompt the entrepreneurs for more details, combining both open-ended and probing questions to capture experiences and clarify details. We also made sure to tentatively ask questions in recognition of the sensitivity of the topic and to establish rapport.
The interview structure consisted of three primary sections. The first section asked for a description and background of the business and the events leading up to its demise and eventual closure. Once sufficient trust had been established between the participant and interviewer (i.e., once the participant started to speak more freely and "open up" about his or her experiences), the second part of the interview explored the emotional impact and loss associated with the closure. The focus here was on the significant events, exchanges, thoughts, feelings, decisions, and motivations the entrepreneur experienced upon closure. Finally, the interview concluded with a discussion of events after the closure, what the entrepreneur had learned, how he/she applied or still applies that learning, and how he/she feels about it now. We used this consistent structure for the interviews but allowed flexibility to go with the flow of the conversation. The transcribed interviews amounted to 390 pages of single-spaced text. Addressing concerns of recall bias or hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975) , we collected additional secondary data about the entrepreneurs, their firms, and the firms' failure from public records, such as the registrar of companies, professional networks, press releases, media reports, and social networking sites (e.g., LinkedIn and Twitter). This secondary data, along with detailed field notes, amounted to an additional 598 pages of single-spaced text and was used to supplement and triangulate the interview data.
Data Analysis
Following the multiple case study method, we first built a case around each entrepreneur and then compared groups of cases to allow a conceptual framework to emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003a Yin, , 2003b . Specifically, we allocated all data into case files. We then coded the data in each case based on categories (or nodes) that appeared to be important to the entrepreneurs. Throughout the coding (and recoding) process, we added categories until the cases' content was well presented by the set of nodes 8 (i.e., saturation was reached). Although we began to notice similarities and differences across cases, we withheld any judgments or inferences until we completed the coding process. We then focused on crosscase analyses to allow insights to emerge from the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1984) . This process began by creating a detailed matrix where all data chunks for a particular node could be compared across cases (this was done for all nodes). To further facilitate cross-case analysis, we made assessments on the level for each construct (node).
The first author and a doctoral candidate (raters) determined the assessment levels for each construct (node). After a training session, the raters independently assessed the levels for all nodes of interest, which resulted in 96% agreement. The few inconsistences typically appeared on the margin of the rating categories (e.g., one rater assessing a "low" level but on the high end of the category and the other rater assessing a "moderate" level but on the low end of this category). On the rare occasion there was disagreement, the raters discussed the specific cell and came to agreement. At times, the raters even went back to the audio recordings to ensure they were capturing the "spirit" of the interviews. Once this summary (i.e., the assessment table) was complete, both first and second authors oscillated between the summary and the detailed table as relationships began to emerge.
Emotional Content of Entrepreneurs' Narratives of Business Failure
The entrepreneurs of the sampled businesses are ideal for investigating the emotional content of the narratives of individuals attempting to make sense of their failure experiences. That is, the entrepreneur's narrative is the unit of analysis because we are interested in the emotions and cognitions associated with making sense of a business failure experience. We set out to create two groups of entrepreneurs' narratives for comparison upon which to build new insights. Following Haynie and Shepherd (2011) , we selected cases of those "doing well" and those "not doing well" based on the levels of negative and positive emotions expressed in their narratives. In categorizing and then assessing the levels of these emotions, we had in mind that negative emotions refer to "the extent to which a person reports feeling 9 upset or unpleasantly aroused" (Watson & Tellegen, 1985, p. 221) . These emotions were portrayed in the feelings of regret, anger, disappointment, frustration, or loneliness which participants expressed when describing events, exchanges, and transactions. Positive emotions refer to "the extent to which a person avows a zest for life" (Watson & Tellegen, 1985, p. 221) . This was revealed through the underlying feelings of pride, happiness, hope, excitement, achievement, confidence, and enthusiasm which participants expressed when describing events, activities, and exchanges. However, we did not force the entrepreneurs to adopt our definitions; rather, they spoke freely in response to questions about, for example, how they felt today and how they felt in the past when their businesses failed. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. We found that some entrepreneurs' narratives reported "doing well" with low negative and high positive emotions and some "not doing well" with high negative and low positive emotions. Of those that reported "doing well", two individuals' narratives reported emotional states that remained consistent over time whereas two individuals' narratives reported an emergence of positive emotions. We labeled as the "Feel Good" group, the two entrepreneurs whose narratives indicated that after business failure, they felt good and had low negative emotions and high positive emotions and these emotional states were consistent across time throughout the narrative ( A discussion of this change is offered in the next section.
Of the narratives that reported entrepreneurs "not doing well", two consistently maintained this emotional state, and we labeled them "Suffering." They (Sam and Sarah) had high negative emotions and low positive emotions. For example, when her business failed Sara tried to make light of the fact that she was facing bankruptcy and Tweeted " [My business partner] and I are drinking large glasses of wine to celebrate the fact that we're worth way much more dead" while later she described how "It was very emotional; it was horrible. There was lot of just pain" (high negative emotion). She also explained how the closing of her business left her "Grateful to be out of it to an extent, [as] you've lived with that fear of losing everything for four or five years, the whole time of having a business" (low positive emotion).
We labeled as the "Delayed Suffering" group, the two entrepreneurs' narratives that reported low negative emotions and low positive emotions around the time of the failure, but showed high negative emotions well after the failure event-at the time of the interview (David and Drew). Similar to the Suffering 11 group, their positive emotions remained low. Their narratives suggest that while David and Drew were able to initially maintain low negative emotions, they were not able to do so for an extended period. A potential explanation for this reaction could be that they were in temporary denial over what had happened. Denial refers to the set of processes that "blot" out threatening information from the conscious mind (Baumeister, Dale & Sommer, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1994; Janis, 1983) , which can keep negative emotions in check but can also diminish positive emotions as the individual struggles to deal with the new reality (Baumeister et al., 1998; Goldberger, 1983; Janoff-Bulman, 1992) . While denial is indeed a useful defense mechanism in the short term (Levine et al., 1987; Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Fletcher, 1985) , it is an unlikely explanation for the Delayed Suffering group in this study because the entrepreneurs in that group recognized from the outset that their businesses had failed and had produced negative consequences.
Instead, the emergence of negative emotions in a narrative is more consistent with the grief literature suggesting that suppressing grief is difficult to maintain over an extended period (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Horowitz, 1976; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1991) as negative emotions will eventually surface (Deutsch, 1937; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Sanders, 1993; Worden, 1991) .
For this study, we eliminated the 5 "moderate" cases (Middle-of-the-Road group) so we could specifically focus on the most important constructs and present them in an efficient manner. Indeed, more extreme cases are more useful for building theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003a Yin, , 2003b . Therefore, of the 13 entrepreneurs of failed businesses from which we collected data, we used eight cases for this study. 
ENTREPRENEURS' NARRATIVES OF BUSINESS FAILURE
Emotions and Making Sense of Business Failure
Psychology research has found that although some negative emotions are necessary to signal the need for sensemaking, negative emotions obstruct learning (Bower, 1992; Dweck, 1986; Kumar, 1997) , which we believe is the case for entrepreneurs learning from business failure (Shepherd, 2003 (Shepherd, , 2009 ).
Negative emotions have been found to narrow attention and obstruct information processing (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Forgas, 2003; Gladstein & Reilly, 1985; Sutton & D'Aunno, 1989; Wells & Matthews, 1994) , which adversely impact sensemaking activities-such as scanning, processing and learning (Daft & Weick, 1984; Shepherd, 2009 ). reported making the most sense of the failure experiences was the Now Feeling Good group. This group reported high negative emotions (and low positive) when the businesses failed and then high positive emotions as time passed. The group of entrepreneurs' narratives that reported having made the least sense of the failure experience was the Delayed Suffering group. These narratives also reported high negative emotions around the time the business failed, but their positive emotions remained low throughout the time covered by the narrative. It is not that negative emotions are required to trigger sensemaking efforts (for instance, all entrepreneurs' narratives expressed some negative emotions although it was low for the Feeling Good group and Delayed Suffering group at the time of the failure); rather, our findings,
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based on entrepreneurs' narratives, suggest that higher levels of negative emotions can provide greater motivation to make sense of failure experiences, provided they eventually dissipate.
………………………………
Insert Table 3 about here ……………………………...
The generation of cognitive resources from positive emotions is consistent with Fredrickson's (1998; 2001) "broaden-and-build" role of positive emotion. Therefore, our addition to the "broadening" role of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998) is the "motivation" role of negative emotions. For example, negative emotions prompt an adaptive response to improve an aversive state, which triggers vigilant and effortful processing (Clark & Isen, 1982; Forgas, 2003; Isen, 1984; Isen, 1987) . In contrast to the other emotional states, low negative emotions and low positive emotions produce little sensemaking about the failure experience. However, while negative emotions should signal something is wrong and the need for sensemaking, the entrepreneurs' narratives in the Delayed Suffering group reflect entrepreneurs not sufficiently "motivated" to explore the events of their past to make sense of their experiences. Furthermore, they did not have the positive emotions to expand the thinking and reflection (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2003; Isen, 1987; 2000) needed to facilitate sensemaking (Huy, 1999; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005 
Emotion-Focused Coping and Making Sense of Business Failure
Building on stress theory (Folkman, 1984) , previous research has focused on two primary forms of coping mechanisms (Endler & Parker, 1990; Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Stanton, Danoff-Burg, Cameron & 14 Ellis, 1994)-problem-focused and emotion-focused coping. Problem-focused coping refers to directing thoughts and efforts toward the problem causing distress with the intention of modifying the troubled person-environment transaction (Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Stanton et al., 1994) . Emotion-focused coping refers to processing emotion during a stressful experience (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Stanton et al., 1994) and involves reducing, regulating, and/or managing the emotional distress associated with the situation (Carver et al., 1989) .
A considerable body of empirical research has highlighted the benefits of problem-focused coping for problem solving, decision making, and direct action (Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Moskowitz, Folkman, Collette & Vittinghoff, 1996) . Problem-focused coping strategies can be aimed at the environment and/or oneself and can trigger a greater sense of control. Through creating new goals and commitment, the individual can prevent (or reduce) feelings of helplessness and instead generate feelings of challenge and hope (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Stein, 1996; Klinger, 1998; Taylor, Helgeson, Reed & Skokan, 1991) . For example, a disagreement between an employee and manager over a particular goal can be resolved by the employee trying to encourage the manager to change his/her goal and/or by changing his/her own behavior to reach a satisfactory result (Folkman, 1984) . In contrast, emotion-focused coping is generally believed to trigger negative outcomes, such as distress and reduced morale. It can interfere with problem-focused coping and can lead individuals to appraise situations and events as uncontrollable, which is more likely to result in harm and/or a sense of loss to the individual (Folkman, 1984; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004; Stanton et al., 2000; Stanton et al., 1994; Stanton, Danoff-Burg, & Huggins, 2002) . As such, perhaps those entrepreneurs' narratives that report problem-focused coping more and emotion-focused coping less reflect greater sensemaking of the failure experience.
Although we found little variance across the entrepreneurs' narratives in terms of problem-focused coping (only one, Geoff, reported low problem-focused coping [see Table 4 ]), all the others reported high or moderate levels of problem-focused coping. However, we did find that those with different levels of 15 emotion-focused coping reflected different levels of progress in making sense of the business failure.
Specifically, we found that those narratives that reflected considerable progress in making sense of the failure experience (Now Feeling Good) reported reliance on emotion-focused coping, and those that reflected making little sense of the failure experience (Delayed Suffering) hardly reported emotion-focused coping at all. The Feeling Good group was moderate in its use of emotion-focused coping, and the Suffering group was mixed. For the Now Feeling Good group, our analysis of the entrepreneurs' narratives suggested that emotion-focused coping facilitated the generation of positive emotions as it "broadened and built" (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001 ) the entrepreneurs' cognitive abilities to make sense of their failure experiences. For example, a year after the closure, Nancy recalls moving to Sydney with her new job: narratives are consistent with findings suggesting that when faced with a trauma, individuals need to use emotion-focused coping to provide the "space" to rebuild their shattered assumptions of the world and themselves (Austenfeld & Stanton, 2004; Coyne & Racioppo, 2000; Haynie & Shepherd, 2011; Stanton et al., 2000) . However, we add to this literature by suggesting that the "space" created by emotion-focused coping also provides the opportunity to generate positive emotions. However, emotions (and coping with them) are not the only factors that contribute to making sense of failure; cognitions also play a role. In the next section, we introduce a cognitive aspect to our emerging emotion-cognition narrative of making sense of business failure.
(Meta)Cognitively Processing Business Failure
Some people have the cognitive capacity for sensemaking more than others. For example, superior learning outcomes arise for those with metacognitive abilities (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; Flavell, 1979; Ford, Smith, Weissbein, Gully & Salas, 1998) , analogical thinking (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Holyoak, 1985; Loewenstein, Thompson & Gentner, 1999) , and cognitive complexity (Bird, 1988; Scott, 1962) .
Metacognition refers to "one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive processes or anything related to them" (Flavell, 1979, p. 232) . In simple terms, metacognition describes the awareness, control, and process of "thinking about thinking." Individuals with greater metacognitive skills learn more as they consciously observe their development and adjust thinking when problems arise (Ford et al., 1998, p. 220) . Next, analogical thinking (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Holyoak, 1985; Loewenstein et al., 1999) refers to the process of comparing between cases, focusing more on relational similarities than superficial differences.
This process allows one to separate relational knowledge and transfer it from one case or experience to the next (Loewenstein et al., 1999) . Finally, cognitive complexity is defined as "the number of independent dimensions-worth of concepts the individual brings to bear in describing a particular domain of phenomena" (Scott, 1962, p. 405) . Individuals with a greater ability to perceive complex differences in the environment are better able to "assimilate contradictory cues" (Larson & Rowland, 1974, p. 38) than those who have more black-and-white perceptions of their environment (Bird, 1988; Larson & Rowland, 1974; Shackley, Wynne & Waterton, 1996) . The implication here (implied and sometimes empirically tested) is that through training that enhances metacognitive awareness, analogical thinking, and cognitive complexity, individuals are better positioned to make sense of their experiences (Aleven & Koedinger, 2002; Bird, 1988; Flavell, 1979; Ford et al., 1998; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Holyoak, 1985) and presumably more from their experiences with business failure.
Along these lines, our findings offer new insights into how these cognitive abilities are deployed.
We found (see Table 5 ) that only the Now Feeling Good entrepreneurs' narratives reflected a high deployment of cognitive strategies and that only the Suffering group reported low deployment. For example, Nick (Now Feeling Good) used an analogical thinking approach in describing how uncertain his future was when his business closed. Rather than explicitly describing the lack of control and uncertainty he felt, which may have been difficult to articulate, he made sense of this experience by relating and comparing business failure to a similar event in the past (i.e., when he left employment to start the business). Comparing experiences in this way, Nick could transfer knowledge from one context to another and explain why he felt and reacted differently (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Holyoak, 1985; Loewenstein et al., 1999) : We found in entrepreneurs' narratives that while negative emotions may trigger sensemaking efforts, the presence of positive emotions provided an emotional context in which cognitive strategies could be used. We also found in entrepreneurs' narratives that emotion-focused coping played a key role in the emergence of these positive emotions. While the Now Feeling Good group reported these effects firsthand, the entrepreneurs' narratives in the Delayed Suffering group did not because the negative emotions reportedly increased after the business failure event while their positive emotions remained low. As these results suggest, the use of cognitive strategies represents a link between the "broaden-and-build" role of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001) and making sense of one's failure experience. We found in entrepreneurs' narratives that simply experiencing negative emotions does not trigger greater cognitive processing (otherwise the Delayed Suffering group would have displayed greater sensemaking), nor does a reduction of negative emotions "free" entrepreneurs to use cognitive strategies to make sense of their failure experiences (otherwise the Feeling Good group would be superior sensemakers). Rather, we found that in entrepreneurs' narratives making more sense of one's failure experiences resulted from experiencing high negative emotions followed by high positive emotions.
In contrast with the "broaden-and-build" hypothesis of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001) , our findings in entrepreneurs' narratives suggest that making sense of business failure is based on more than the availability of cognitive resources through positive emotions. Rather, these cognitive resources need to be assessed and used. That is, the trigger for deploying these cognitive resources may be diffused and not easily recognized. Although negative emotions are considered the antithesis of engaging cognitive 20 strategies, our findings indicate they play an important role. In the entrepreneurs' narratives, it is moving from high negative (and low positive) emotions at the time of the failure event to high positive (and low negative) emotions and the processing of these emotions through emotion-focused coping strategies that contribute to a high magnitude of "building" and "broadening," thereby triggering the cognitive strategies necessary for sensemaking.
DISCUSSION
With the high rate of business failure in most economies (Brüderl et al., 1992; Wiklund et al., 2010) , there is an urgent need for "a deeper conceptualization of the process and content dimensions of learning from venture failure" (Cope, 2011, p. 604) . We build on the growing corpus of work on learning from failure that has focused on emotional barriers to making sense of one's failure experiences (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011) , learning outcomes (Singh, Corner, & Pavlovich, 2007) , and the content and nature of learning tasks and timeframes (Cope, 2011) . However, the actual sensemaking process-as well as individual differences in that process-is still largely unknown. In this paper, we investigated entrepreneurs' narratives and identified variance in their emotional reactions to business failure and theorized how different emotional states trigger different coping strategies and influence how entrepreneurs (meta)cognitively process business failure to make sense of their experiences.
Implications for Research on the Emotional Reactions to Business Failure
Business failure is an emotional event for entrepreneurs, and research on this topic to date has focused on the negative emotions generated by this negative event (Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, Covin & Kuratko, 2009; during business failure. In particular, our study had no cases of ambivalent entrepreneurs-namely, those simultaneously experiencing high negative and high positive emotions (Fong, 2006; Larsen, McGraw & Cacioppo, 2001; Williams & Aaker, 2002) (albeit the Now Feeling Good group's narratives reflected high negative and high positive emotions consecutively). It would be interesting to explore the notion of ambivalence and the extent to which entrepreneurs with this combination of emotions make sense of their failure experiences.
Additionally, in positive psychology, recovery from negative experiences is explained in terms of psychological resilience-namely, the ability to "bounce back" from adversity (Fredrickson, 1998) . The "broaden-and-build" framework (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001 ) is used to explain how resilient individuals with high positive emotions (and an ability to manage negative emotions) find meaning in stressful situations (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004) . Our study indicates that positive emotions are also important in making sense of business failure. We found that in entrepreneurs' narratives high negative emotions followed by high positive emotions resulted in a cognitive process that facilitated sensemaking. For example, entrepreneurs' narratives from the Now Feeling Good group, that reported making the most sense from their failure experiences, initially experienced high negative emotions and low positive emotions before progressing to low negative emotions and high positive emotions. However, individuals' narratives that consistently reported low negative emotions and high positive emotions (Feeling Good group)-those which displayed the greatest resilience-reported little sensemaking about their failure experiences. We propose future research could further consider this relationship between positive and negative emotions.
We recommend additional attention on the practice of limiting negative emotions to stimulate greater positive thinking, especially if negative emotions can potentially aid in sensemaking. Furthermore, we advise revisiting the meaning of "bouncing back" from adversity and suggest considering a more holistic impression of "recovery" to consider how and what constitutes an individual's sensemaking of his or her failure experiences.
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Recovery from business failure is "a complex sense-making process . . . that involves both avoidance and confrontation" coping styles (Cope, 2011, p. 611) . Shepherd (2003) suggests that this dichotomous relationship can best be managed to facilitate learning by oscillating between a loss (i.e., confrontation) orientation and a restoration (i.e., avoidance) orientation. However, our study showed this oscillation did not occur for all entrepreneurs. Also, while all entrepreneurs' narratives displayed signs of problem-focused coping, only some narratives also displayed emotion-focused coping. Those who experienced both (Now Feeling Good) actually progressed the most in making sense of their failure experiences, as a dual process model of grief recovery from business failure (Shepherd, 2003) would suggest. Focusing on the failure event and its associated emotions produced greater cognitive analysis and reflexivity, which presented a stable platform from which the entrepreneurs could progress. This finding raises an important question for how entrepreneurs cope with business failure. Future research could explore why entrepreneurs do not engage in emotion-focused coping and how they may be trained and encouraged to take a more balanced approach to coping with failure to facilitate sensemaking.
Furthermore, research on entrepreneurial learning has focused on the cognitive and mental processes of how entrepreneurs learn (Corbett, Neck & DeTienne, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2002) . However, despite the learning potential of business failure (Chuang & Baum, 2003; Knott & Posen, 2005; McGrath, 1999; Sitkin, 1992) , the "distinctive learning processes" following business failure are largely unknown (Cope, 2011, p. 604) . Our study contributes to the understanding of these learning processes. We suggest learning from business failure is a sensemaking process that requires an interplay of higher-order thinking, including metacognition (Flavell, 1979; Ford et al., 1998) , analogous thinking (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Holyoak, 1985; Loewenstein et al., 1999) , and complex thinking (Bird, 1988; Larson & Rowland, 1974; Scott, 1962; Shackley et al., 1996) . From our data, we inducted that those narratives that represented higher-level learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985) , demonstrated heightened attention, and questioned beliefs and assumptions (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Cope, 2003; Schön, 1983 ) displayed advanced cognitive processing 23 skills while those which displayed superficial levels of learning and reflection learned less. This demonstrates that in situations of stress and adversity (of which business failure is a good example), those with greater cognitive capacity can progress more in their sensemaking efforts because they adjust their sensemaking by monitoring progress and keeping their problems more in check (Ford et al., 1998) . Future research could further explore learning from a sensemaking perspective and how this learning is influenced by entrepreneurs' emotional states.
Additionally, adopting a sensemaking perspective to learning from failure requires continuously evolving plausible reflective accounts that inform current action Weick et al., 2005) .
Therefore, the entrepreneur needs time to scan for relevant information, process it, and learn from it (Daft & Weick, 1984; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Thomas, Clark, & DA, 1993; Weick, 1979) , thus making time an important variable in the recovery process. Our study introduced two time periods in the generative of a narrative: the period immediately surrounding the business failure and the post-failure period. Two groups reported significant changes in emotional states across these two timeframes covered by the narratives:
the Now Feeling Good group moved from low positive/high negative emotions at the time of failure to high positive/low negative emotions sometime after failure, and the Delayed Suffering group (low negative/low positive emotions) showed an increase in negative emotions as time passed, showing that business failure is indeed a dynamic experience (at least for some entrepreneurs). Future research can explore how entrepreneurs' changing emotional states impact their coping, sensemaking, and entrepreneurial processes.
Research Limitations
As with all studies, this study has a number of limitations. First, like much of the research on trauma and loss, our study largely depends on the accuracy of participants' accounts. To ensure the precision of these self-reports, we attempted to corroborate interviews with field notes, media, 24 administrative, and public legal material to create robust cases for analysis. Furthermore, it was clear from our interviews that the entrepreneurs had little problem remembering the details surrounding this personal, highly impactful event. Second, although our findings allude to the importance of time in the recovery process, this study is primarily based on retrospective interviews to capture the entrepreneurs' narratives.
Capturing the emotional transition as it unfolds over time could perhaps generate more fine-grained findings including how the narrative may change over time. However, it is notoriously difficult to identify, contact, and locate entrepreneurs of failed businesses at the time of failure. This difficulty arises due to the cessation of business records and business contact details as well as changes in personal contact details due to the loss of homes in the wake of bankruptcy. Additionally, it is understandable that entrepreneurs tend to be reluctant to share (what is often) intensely painful events as they experience them. Therefore, despite the value that could be gained from a longitudinal real-time study, there are many challenges in doing so.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents an overview of the emotional landscape of business failure. By examining different emotional states, we explore how entrepreneurs' narratives reflect sensemaking of their failure experiences. We build on existing research identifying that business failure generates negative emotions and suggest that despite the difficulties negative emotions present for entrepreneurs, together with emotion-focused coping, they play a valuable role in prompting reflection and analysis after failure events.
However, making sense of these internal explorations also demands greater cognitive resources (for attention and processing). In entrepreneurs' narratives, cognitive resources become available by the onset of positive emotions, which, through expanding cognitive structures, thoughts, and actions (Fredrickson, 2001 ), create a positive cognitive context. In this study, entrepreneurs' narratives that expressed higher levels of negative emotions and also expressed higher levels of emotion-focused coping, positive emotions, and cognitive analysis exhibited higher levels of sensemaking of their business failure experiences. 
Example 3: Superficial Thinking
Sam describes his pragmatic, almost black-and-white approach to dealing with stress and set-backs. "It just happens, doesn't it? I see you've got two routes to take when that happens. One you just sort of say, well, we gave it our best shot; let's try again with something else. Or, you get all, frustrated, annoyed, and depressed about it." He says "One -we gave it our best shot" in a rational, logical tone and says "Two -get all frustrated, annoyed and depressed about it" in a more flippant, irrational way, emphasising and dragging out the words "frustrated," "annoyed" and "depressed" -emphasising a futility in thinking that way. 
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